Corruption and Police Legitimacy in Lahore, Pakistan

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Police legitimacy is an important topic of criminological research, yet it has received only sporadic study in societies where there is widespread police corruption, where the position of the police is less secure, and where social order is more tenuous. Analysing data from a probability sample survey of adults in Lahore, Pakistan, we examine the empirical links between people’s experience of police corruption, their perceptions of the fairness and effectiveness of the police, and their beliefs about the legitimacy of the police. Our findings suggest that in a context in which minimal effectiveness and integrity is yet to be established, police legitimacy may rest not just on the procedural fairness of officers, but also on their demonstrated ability to control crime and avoid corruption.

Key words: policing, trust, legitimacy, corruption, procedural justice, Pakistan

Introduction

Procedural justice theory is premised on the idea that most people obey the law most of the time because they think it is the right thing to do, not simply because compliance is in their own best interests (Tyler 2006a; 2006b). Providing a normative lens through which to understand how people might best be policed, procedural justice theory posits a string of connected empirical links between (1) the treatment people receive at the hands of criminal justice officials; (2) the legitimacy people confer, as a consequence, on institutions of justice including the police and the criminal courts; (3) the authority that these institutions can then command and (4) public preparedness to obey the police, comply with the law and cooperate with the justice system (Tyler and Huo 2002; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Jackson et al. 2012a; Hough et al. 2013a; Mazerolle et al. 2013; Tyler and Jackson 2014).

Legitimacy is central to procedural justice theory. Legitimacy exists in the eyes of citizens (1) when authorities such as the police have earned an entitlement to command from those they govern and (2) when they act in ways that justify existing power structures (Tyler 2004; 2006a; 2006b; 2009; Jackson et al. 2012a; 2012b; Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Hough et al. 2013a; 2013b). Legitimacy is important because it constrains power; study after study has shown that authorities have to act in fair and just ways if they are to be seen to be rightful holders of power by subordinates (Terrill 2001; McCluskey 2003). But legitimacy is also important because it reduces the tension between power holders and subordinates (in the words of Coicaud 2013: 40): the same body of empirical work supports the idea that, when legal authorities act in procedurally just ways, the resulting legitimacy that this engenders in turn encourages people to...
cooperate with officials, defer to them in moments of crisis, obey the laws they enforce and accept the state’s right to monopolize the use of force in society (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2004; 2011b; Papachristos et al. 2012; Jackson et al. 2012b; Jackson et al. 2013; Hough et al. 2013a; 2013b; Mazerolle et al. 2013; Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd 2013; Tyler and Jackson 2014; Meares and Tyler 2014; Bradford et al. 2014a; Bradford 2014; Nivette 2014).

On this account legitimacy is a necessary—albeit not sufficient—pre-condition of normatively desirable or democratic forms of policing. Without the voluntary consent of the public, police have to turn to repressive, force-led and unjustified styles to secure public compliance, undermining in turn their claim to be acting on behalf of and in cooperation with those they police (Tyler 2009; Schulhofer et al. 2011). Yet, the importance of legitimacy and procedural justice has received less attention outside liberal democratic contexts marked by relatively high levels of social integration and state legitimacy (Israel is an obvious and partial exception). This is a surprising omission given that legitimacy may in fact matter more in contexts in which the police have yet to achieve widespread justification of power and position, in which police corruption and an inability to maintain law and order remain two major problems, and in which democratic modes of policing have yet to develop.

Such research as exists from the Caribbean (Reisig and Lloyd 2009; Kochel et al. 2013), Ghana (Tankebe 2009; 2010) and South Africa (Bradford et al. 2014a) is broadly supportive of procedural justice theory. But these studies also stress the importance of police corruption and perceived effectiveness. On the one hand, Tankebe (2010) linked public experience of police corruption in Ghana to people’s beliefs that the police are ineffective, unfair and untrustworthy. On the other hand, Bradford et al. (2014a) linked public perceptions of police corruption in South Africa to people’s belief that the police are illegitimate. Building on this extant evidence, our goal in this article is to (1) focus on Pakistan, (2) examine the link between people’s experience of police corruption and their perceptions of police legitimacy, and (3) assess whether instrumental concerns about effectiveness are just as important a predictor of police legitimacy as relational concerns about fairness. A probability sample survey of just over 400 adult residents of two towns in urban Lahore, Pakistan constitutes what is to our knowledge the first study into corruption, procedural justice and legitimacy in South Asia.

Our article proceeds as follows. We give an overview of policing in Pakistan; we discuss procedural justice theory; and having drawn out a series of relevant hypotheses to be tested in this study, we outline the methodology and then the findings. Our concluding remarks address some implications of our work for some contextually specific drivers of police legitimacy.

Legitimacy and the rule of law in Pakistan

Pakistan represents, in many ways, a very different context to the liberal-democratic states in which studies of police legitimacy have been conducted, states that (broadly speaking) have a history of legitimate government, and that (again broadly speaking) have criminal justice systems oriented toward serving their populations, or at least maintaining law and order on their behalf. Ruled for a long time as part of the British empire—and before that by more local empires and kingdoms—the role of the police (and police-like structures) in Pakistan was to provide in the first instance protection for
the imperial regime; after that for administrative affairs (e.g., the collection of taxes); and only finally, if at all, to maintain law and order on behalf of the general population.

The fundamental duty of the police was to curb rebellion. During British rule the maintenance of law and order via importation of a version of the British criminal justice system became important (Kumar and Verma 2009), but this remained a coercive criminal justice system employed primarily to control the population (Imam 2011). Various methods were utilized in order to ensure that the system remained beneficial for the British rulers. All decision-making power rested with the colonial administration; the native population was subject to a strict regime of inspection checks (Kumar and Verma 2009); and any notion of local governance was resisted (Mohan 2010). The police service was loyal to—and essentially served only—the colonial administration and was used as a tool to control and suppress the general population (Griffiths 1971; Kumar and Verma 2011). British rule was premised to a significant degree on a system of policing that served to both justify (since the native population was held to be incapable of policing itself and hence in need of external intervention) and maintain the supremacy of the colonial power (Arnold 1977).

During British rule, an independent criminal justice system with the development of police structures oriented toward serving the general population was simply not a relevant aim, and after independence in 1947 the police and criminal justice system remained essentially unchanged. The old colonial masters were replaced by the elites of the new-born country, and the police remained unsuccessful—or perhaps more correctly uninterested—in fulfilling any kind of service role and, often, in providing even a minimal sense of security or protection for ordinary people. The successful capture of the police by post-independence elites meant that the general population and police remained distant—something that in itself likely undermined police performance and weakened even further its performance (Imam 2011).

Fast forward to the present day and police corruption remains a major problem. The sheer extent of police corruption is most keenly shown by the National Corruption Perceptions Surveys that Transparency International conduct in Pakistan. From 2002 to 2010, the public identified the police as the most corrupt state organization in the country (Transparency International Pakistan 2011). In 2011, 18 per cent of the nationally representative sample reported having encountered the police in the past 12 months, and of those who had experienced recent contact, 54 per cent said that they ‘felt compelled to pay a bribe.' By contrast, a greater proportion of people had had experience with the health department (39 per cent) and education department (25 per cent), with fewer proportions reporting having felt the need to pay a bribe (15 per cent for the health department and 9 per cent for the education department).

It is a common observation in Pakistani society that elites are in a highly advantageous position vis à vis the police and other security providers. To many people this amounts to the belief that laws are made and enforced in order to benefit the elite rather than the ordinary citizen (Rafique 2004). A recent example of this is the emergence of a

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1In the 2009 National Corruption Perceptions Survey, respondents were asked why they interacted with the police. The most common reasons were to get a crime report, for violation of traffic laws, and to get release from a false arrest. More than half of the respondents who had experienced a recent interaction with the police reported having paid a bribe specifically to sidestep traffic violations, fines for the lack of vehicle fitness, to get an initial crime report, or to avoid false arrest. When asked why they thought there was corruption in the police sector, the most common reasons expressed were ‘lack of accountability’, ‘low salaries’ and too much ‘discretionary power’.
‘VIP culture’ in response to terrorism. As a result of the greater perceived threat faced by political, business and media elites—and the fact that these elites have access to the kind of influence and connections mentioned above—such ‘VIPs’ receive far greater levels of protection from the police than ordinary citizens could ever hope to experience (Abbas 2009). This encourages the impression that police (and other security services) exist to serve the elite instead of providing security to the masses (Imam 2011), further undermining public trust in the ability of the police to serve all citizens equally.

In sum, while people in Pakistan still have some sort of expectation that police will act to maintain order and the rule of law and order (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994; Marenin and Das 2000), the law itself seems to have little normative power (certainly over police officers), and the violation of rules seems to be commonly observed in routine encounters with the police. People in Pakistan seem not to feel ‘equal before the law’ or, rather, before the police. Citizens without the right connections risk bribery and blackmail during any interaction with officers (Muhammad and Conway 2005). People often fear police and are unwilling to contact them because they do not expect fair and transparent treatment either in the first instance or during any subsequent legal process (Bashir 2011), or believe, justifiably, that they will be required to pay for such an experience. All of this suggests that people feel alienated from and distrust the police; that the police are a hindrance to—rather than a promoter of—just process and the rule of law; and that from the perspective of the public, not only are the police primarily a tool in the hands of the elites, they are also corrupt in their practices. Citizens seem to have a very different relationship with a police service that has not been configured to serve them in any meaningful way, in marked contrast with the situation in developed societies, where the idea that a key part of the police role is helping citizens is commonly accepted (albeit, of course, that police have many other roles as well, and that some citizens do not have this type of relationship with police).

It is precisely these conditions that lead us to apply procedural justice theory (see below) in this context. Trust in the ability of the state to maintain the rule of law—and public justification for the monopoly on the use of force the state commands—started out low and if anything has been eroding in recent years (Kemal 2003; Khan 2007). The state has proved itself not entirely unaware of this issue, and committees for police reform have been formed many times in Pakistan, in 1960–61 (Imam 2011); 1961–62 (Suddle 2002); 1972–73 (Suddle 2008), 1976; 1981–83 (Imam 2011); 1985 (Suddle 2002); 1989–95 (Suddle 2008); and 1999–2009 (Suddle 2008). Yet, there is very little evidence of any success. Against this backdrop it would hardly be surprising if, in such a situation, citizens question the legitimacy of the police and turn instead to alternative providers of security (Abrahams 2002).

What, then, is the extent of police corruption in Pakistan (we focus in this article on the capital of the Punjab Province, Lahore)? Is police corruption linked to low perceived police legitimacy? Is procedural justice a strong predictor of police legitimacy, like it is in Anglo-Saxon countries? Might effectiveness and corruption be equally—if not more—important, as has been found in Ghana (Tankebe 2009; 2010)? To assess the links between people’s experience of corruption, beliefs about the fairness and effectiveness of the police and perceptions of legitimacy, we draw upon procedural justice theory to structure our analysis. We also extend the framework to include the experience of power-holder corruption. In the next section we detail procedural justice theory and draw out appropriate hypotheses to be tested in this study.

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Being concerned with the legitimate use of power and authority, procedural justice theory states that people place great importance on the justice or fairness of authority’s behaviour, where individuals are less interested in the effectiveness of the authority, or in the outcomes it provides, than in the processes by which it makes decisions and in the motivations behind its actions. What looms most prominently in people’s minds when assessing an authority is the fairness of the processes through which power is exercised, with many empirical studies indicating that people are ready to forgive or discount unfavourable or unsatisfactory outcomes at the hands of authorities, if they believe that the processes that led to those outcomes were fair (Tyler 2006b). The experience of procedural justice is, furthermore, linked to motive-based trust, which is a form of trust linked to assessments of motivation rather than performance (Tyler and Huo 2002).

Applied to the police, Tyler’s procedural justice model predicts that when officers treat people with respect and dignity, utilize neutral and fair decision-making processes, and allow people a voice in the interaction, those officers communicate messages of status and worth to the individual concerned (that they are valued and respected members of the social group the police represent). The exercise of authority via the application of fair process—by treating people in ways that are recognized to be fair, respectful and legal and making fair and neutral decisions—strengthens the social bonds between individuals and authorities (Tyler and Huo 2002; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2006a; 2011a; Hough 2013). The application and experience of procedural justice demonstrates that their power is balanced by due process and that they are acting in accordance with values of legality and propriety, meaning that people are more likely to regard the police as legitimate, to defer to their authority, and to feel that the power they wield is justified (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler et al. 2010; Meares and Tyler 2014).

Procedural justice has been shown to be important in many contexts where people are required to submit to the authority and/or decisions of others, such as, for example work settings (Blader and Tyler 2009). People in organizations react to manager’s decisions more favourably, and are motivated to cooperate within and work on behalf of the organization, when they feel fairly treated across the kinds of criteria outlined above. But there are reasons to think that procedural justice maybe particularly important in the context of criminal justice, and especially policing. The emphasis on fairness among the policed seems likely to be rooted, in part, in recognition of the extent of the powers police officers wield. Police activity can have significant implications for those caught up in it, making the fairness of police activity particularly salient to them and indeed anyone with an awareness of what the police can, potentially, do. Moreover, officers in Pakistan as much as anywhere else are often acting in contexts where levels of external supervision are very low, and where the level of discretion allowed to them is very high. Another reason for the prioritization of procedural fairness may therefore be that it demonstrates that police are restrained in the use of the extensive powers vested in them.

Procedural justice may thus indicate that police are not abusing their discretion. Although it is unlikely that many members of the public think explicitly in such terms, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that when police behave in a fair manner they indicate (alongside the factors outlined above) that their use of power is not untrammeled but is constrained within a normative framework—in essence that they are not simply allowed to do what they want. This factor may be particularly important in a
context such as Pakistan, where all too often police do simply do what they want, abusing the discretion allowed them and power available to them with little fear of reprisal. This may be another reason why procedural justice is so closely linked to legitimacy, and perhaps a particularly important one in Pakistan.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a bridging concept in procedural justice theory because it links the procedural fairness of authorities to relevant law-related behaviours and attitudes. While definitions vary widely, a key feature of many is the idea that people defer to, and cooperate with, legitimate authorities because they feel it is right to do so. The standard way to define legitimacy is to say that it exists when people feel that they have a positive obligation to abide by the rules set forth and enforced by a particular authority (such as the police). We might therefore say that the police are legitimate when citizens feel obligated to obey police directives and obey the laws that the police enforce. More broadly: ‘If citizens believe that legal authorities are legitimate, they regard them as entitled to be obeyed. In such a situation, they obey laws because they regard deferring to social authorities as part of the obligations associated with citizenship’ (Darley et al. 2002: 43).

But others maintain that this is a somewhat narrow concept of legitimacy (Tankebe 2009; Hough et al. 2010; Jackson et al. 2012a; 2012b; Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Tyler and Jackson 2014). In as much as it is granted by the individual to the institution, legitimacy might also be the moral justification (in the eyes of the policed) of an institution’s existence, function, power and activity. Normative justifiability is, in the words of Beetham (2013: 24), the idea that: ‘The rules of power and its exercise conform to accepted beliefs about the rightful source of authority and the proper ends or purposes of power and standards in its exercise.’ Feeling a duty to obey the police and law may be one important aspect of police legitimacy, where consent and authorization motivate behaviour.

Yet, another aspect of police legitimacy may reflect the belief that the institution has a moral right to power, where power is being exercised in ways that very broadly speaking defend and represent the values of citizens (Jackson et al. 2012a; 2012b; Tyler and Jackson 2013; 2014). On this account, judgements among individuals about the legitimacy of an institution are based on assessments of the congruence between its goals, practices and behaviours and their own (Hough et al. 2010; Jackson et al. 2011; Bradford et al. 2014b). This normative alignment (the sense that police officers are seen to have an appropriate sense of right and wrong in the eyes of citizens) gives the institution the moral right to power in the eyes of those they govern (Beetham 1991; Bottoms and Tankebe 2013). In turn, it may also motivate behaviour through a sense of value congruence and a heightened sense of social obligation (Jackson et al. 2012a).

The most common strategy of prior research is to conceptualise legitimacy as a combination of felt obligation to obey legal authorities (operationalized through survey questions like: ‘People should obey the law even if it goes against what they think is right’ and ‘You should obey the police, even if you disagree with the reasons for the action’) and generalized trust and confidence (indexed by items such as: ‘On the whole Chicago police officers are honest’ and ‘The basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Chicago courts’). These items are typically combined into one index of

\[ \text{Index of Legitimacy} = \frac{\text{Felt Obligation} + \text{Generalized Trust}}{2} \]

Other studies have measured legitimacy using only generalized trust indicators, removing deference, authorization and consent to power from the operational definition (Tankebe 2009; Murphy et al. 2009; Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd 2013).
legitimacy (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; see also Reisig et al. 2007; Gau 2011). According to this definition, to find an authority to be legitimate is to feel that it is one’s duty to obey the instructions of police officers and judges (one grants legal institutions the authority to dictate appropriate behaviour) and that those authorities have one’s best interests at heart (one believes that the power is being exercised in ways that are normatively justified).  

A second approach is to treat legitimacy as multidimensional and statistically model the dimensions separately (Reisig et al. 2007; Jackson et al. 2012a; 2012b; Tyler and Jackson 2014; Dirikx and Van den Bulck 2014). This has been the approach of a series of comparative European studies (Jackson et al. 2011; Hough et al. 2013a; 2013b) that has distinguished between felt obligation to obey the police and beliefs about the morality and lawfulness of the police (Jackson et al. 2014). Taking the lead from this European work (as well as Tyler and Jackson’s 2014, recent national study of US citizens), we ask people in Lahore, Pakistan about their felt obligation to obey the police and about their generalized trust in the police (assuming that generalized trust reflects normative alignment) and we model these separately in statistical analysis. We reason that the first is authorization of power holders (people recognize the right to the police to dictate appropriate behaviour) and that the second is justification of power structures (people believe that the police wield their power in ways that encapsulate the interests of the public, thus making the possession and exercise of power morally valid).  

We examine the value of differentiating between two dimensions of legitimacy in a procedural justice framework that also includes people’s experience of police corruption.

**Procedural justice and legitimacy**

In order to examine the links between beliefs about police procedural fairness and beliefs about police legitimacy in Lahore, we ask respondents about whether they believe police officers are respectful, impartial and willing to engage in dialogue with members of the public, and we link the answers that they give to their perceptions of the legitimacy of power holders. Hypotheses 1 and 2 refer to posited links between people’s perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police and (respectively) felt obligation to obey (H1) and generalized trust in the police (H2):

H1: Perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police will be positively associated with felt obligation to obey, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of the effectiveness of the police and experience of police corruption.

H2: Perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police will be positively associated with generalized trust in the police, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of the effectiveness of the police and experience of police corruption.

Hypothesis 1 is premised on the idea that when authorities wield their authority in fair and just ways, this indicates to people in society that they are valued and have status,
which in turn encourages people to identify with the group that the authority represents and internalize the value that it is morally just to obey the police (Tyler 2006a; 2006b). Authorization is the positive recognition that an institution has the authority to determine appropriate behaviour within some situation (Kelman and Hamilton 1989).

Hypothesis 2 is based on the idea that when authorities wield their authority in fair and just ways, this indicates to people that those authorities have their best interests at heart. Motive-based trust (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler 2006a) stems from the notion that the trustworthiness of organizations or institutions is founded on estimates of character and affect—perceptions that the trustee has the best interests of the truster at heart. Primarily social rather than instrumental in character, motive-based trust is premised on an acknowledgement of shared social bonds and the communication of group inclusion and status.

Police effectiveness and legitimacy

In contrast to the relational nature of procedural justice, the association between perceptions of the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the police is generally seen as reflecting an instrumental motivation to legitimate the police. The idea here is that people legitimize legal authorities when they believe that the authorities provide safety, are a strong deterrent force, and are quick to catch criminals and respond to criminal events. This is an image of legitimate policing that centres upon risk, deterrence, efficiency and social control. Relating to the external promise of reducing criminal behaviour and threat, it refers to net gains regarding social control and credible threat (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Jackson and Sunshine 2007; Jackson and Bradford 2009; Sun et al. 2013).

Thus far, research in Anglophone contexts shows that perceptions of effectiveness are less strongly associated with police legitimacy compared to perceptions of procedural fairness. But perceived effectiveness may be more important in quite different countries (Ghana, see Tankebe 2009; and South Africa, Bradford et al. 2014a) and more important for particular social groups (e.g. certain ethnic minority groups in Australia, see Murphy and Cherney 2012; Sargeant et al. 2014). In a survey of 374 adult residents of Accra, Tankebe (2009) found that judgements of the procedural fairness and effectiveness of the police were equally strongly associated with generalized trust in the police. Moreover, procedural fairness was more strongly associated with felt obligation to obey the police than perceptions of effectiveness, and importantly, while the statistical effect of perceived procedural fairness on cooperation was entirely mediated by legitimacy, perceived effectiveness still had a significant and substantive statistical effect on cooperation above and beyond any particular pathway via legitimacy.

Tankebe subsequently speculated that the police in Ghana had yet to build the capacity to act effectively and secure public security. While procedural justice did seem to be linked to police legitimacy—and might therefore motivate normative cooperation—perceived effectiveness was also important in explaining variation in legitimacy and cooperation because the police had yet to establish a ‘minimum threshold of police effectiveness’ (ibid: 1281) in that context, leading people to a more utilitarian, rational choice approach to consent to power and cooperation with the justice system. Similarly, in a nationally representative study of South Africa, Bradford et al. (2014a) found that compared to perceived fairness, perceived effectiveness was more strongly correlated
with felt duty to obey the police and the belief that the police act morally (thus legitimating dominant power structures).

In order to address these issues in Lahore, hypotheses 3 and 4 refer to posited links between people's perceptions of the effectiveness of the police and (respectively) felt obligation to obey and generalized trust in the police:

H3: Perceptions of the effectiveness of the police will be positively associated with felt obligation to obey, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police and experience of police corruption.

H4: Perceptions of the effectiveness of the police will be positively associated with generalized trust in the police, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police and experience of police corruption.

Hypothesis 3 is premised on the idea that, when authorities seem to be effective at crime control, people tend to internalize the value that it is morally just to obey the police. Authorization may, in some sense, be premised on the perceived success of formal policing: people may grant the police power in exchange for social order; they may cede power and authority to the police in exchange for social regulation and justice; and this conferral of power and consent to police authority may to some degree depend upon the strength of social order at a local level (Jackson et al. 2012b). The police organization may garner legitimacy from the extent to which the establishment and reproduction of normative social order is strong, or more specifically from the extent that the police are effective in deterring crime and dealing with risk (Bradford et al. 2014c).

Hypothesis 4 is based on the idea that when authorities are effectively deterring and catching criminals, this indicates to people that the authority has their best interests at heart. People may feel a stronger sense of identification and pride in relation to groups they feel are successful (Blader and Tyler 2009)—most pertinently, groups that are effective in protecting their members—and may thus feel more closely aligned with group representatives, particularly those charged with providing such protection. Conversely, a lack of an effective police service may signal abandonment and exclusion to those forced to live under such conditions, weakening their sense that police are ‘on their side’ and share their values.

Corruption and legitimacy

Finally, we link people’s experience of police corruption to their perceptions of police effectiveness, fairness and legitimacy. In a recent examination of people’s experience and perceptions of police corruption in Ghana, Tankebe (2010) measured personal experience (e.g. when they had paid money to the police to overlook their unlawful behaviour), vicarious experience (e.g. witnessing someone paying money to the police to overlook their unlawful behaviour), and beliefs about the extent to which police leadership tackle and control corruption. He found that vicarious experience and beliefs about the control of corruption predicted people’s sense of the effectiveness, fairness and trustworthiness of the police.

We measured people’s personal and vicarious experience of police corruption by asking survey respondents (1) whether they had ever paid money to a police officer or promised the officer a favour and (2) whether they had ever witnessed somebody paying
money to a police officer or promising favour. Hypotheses 5 and 6 refer to posited links between people’s experience of police corruption and (respectively) felt obligation to obey and generalized trust in the police:

H5: Experience of police corruption will be positively associated with felt obligation to obey, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of the procedural fairness and effectiveness of the police.

H6: Experience of police corruption will be positively associated with generalized trust in the police, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of the procedural fairness and effectiveness of the police.

Hypothesis 5 is premised on the idea that corruption undermines the legitimate authority of the police. When the police are corrupt, one no longer feels a positive obligation to obey the police. The rejection of the authority of the police is the rejection of a corrupt police force: one does feel a social, legal, or moral tie—which involves a constraining power of a promise, contract, law or sense of duty—to an institution that misuses its power for its own gain.

Hypothesis 6 is based on the idea that corruption undermines the sense that the police have the best interests of citizens at heart. By taking bribes or favours in exchange for certain outcomes and treatment, the police no longer seem trustworthy, because they are wielding their power in ways that match their own material and cultural interests, not the interests of citizens and justice.

The study

Like prior work on procedural justice and legitimacy, we use a cross-sectional survey to measure key concepts. Our data come from a survey conducted in the capital of the Punjab Province in Pakistan. Two of the nine towns of Lahore were first picked randomly. Then, circles (an area with an average population of 6,000), localities (an area or neighbourhood consisting of an average population of 1,000) and then households in each town were selected randomly using the 1998 census database (Pakistan Population Census Organization 1998). A sample of 450 households was drawn using a multistage random sampling procedure. From the sampled households, either an adult male or female was interviewed depending upon their availability at the time of survey. Strikingly, however, 78 per cent of our final sample was male. This figure matches the 2009 Transparency International survey on corruption in Pakistan. Their explanation is illuminating: ‘In a male dominated society, interaction with the world outside the home is a man’s prerogative, hence 87 per cent of our respondents were male’ (Transparency International Pakistan 2009: 23).

Overall, 404 interviews were conducted successfully. About 46 interviewees quit during the interview or did not answer many questions due to shortage of time or loss of interest during interview. The study response rate was 90 per cent. Our survey was planned and written in English, then translated into the national language of Pakistan, Urdu. Two languages are spoken frequently in Lahore. Urdu is spoken formally in offices and education institutes, and Punjabi is spoken informally in streets and localities. On the small number of occasions (26 of the 404 interviews) when Punjabi was needed, the

It is assumed that the experience of police corruption will be negatively correlated with perceptions of the procedural fairness and effectiveness of the police.
questionnaire was translated verbally by the interviewer. Sociodemographic characteristics of interviewees are described in Table 1. Note that there is no information on ethnicity because the vast majority of the Lahore population has a Punjabi background.

**Measures**

**Police legitimacy**

As mentioned above, legitimacy was conceived of as two distinct (albeit connected, see Jackson et al. 2014) psychological constructs. The first is felt duty to obey police directives. One example of a measure used is agreement or disagreement to the following statement: ‘You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not understand.’ This aspect of legitimacy taps into the notion that an authority is legitimate when people recognize the authority’s right to dictate appropriate behaviour (because they believe they should (rather than because, for example, they feel they will be sanctioned if they do not). The second construct is generalized trust in the police. One example of the measures used was agreement or disagreement to the following statement: ‘The Lahore police are trustworthy.’ If people feel that the authorities are sincere, benevolent, and concerned about their welfare, then they trust them to act in ways that benefit the people over whom they exercise authority. This justifies existing power structures in the eyes of the policed. For discussion on the meaning and measurement of police legitimacy, see Jackson et al. (2012a), Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) and Tyler and Jackson (2013; 2014).

**Perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police**

To measure people’s perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police, we asked respondents about officers’ respectfulness, impartiality, and willingness to engage in dialogue. A representative measure was agreement or disagreement to the statement ‘The police treat everyone with respect.’

**Perceptions of the effectiveness of the police**

To measure people’s perceptions of the effectiveness of the police, we asked respondents about the ability of the police to pursue criminals, respond promptly

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<th>Characteristics in percentage (N = 404)</th>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>26–33</td>
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<td>34–41</td>
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<td>42+</td>
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<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>Unmarried</td>
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<td>Married</td>
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<td>Gulberg</td>
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<td>Occupation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily wagers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police contact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No contact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Sociodemographic characteristics of respondents
to calls about crime, control violent crime and provide assistance to the public when such assistance is needed.

**Direct and indirect experience of police corruption**

Finally, we asked respondents whether they had paid money to a police officer or promised the officer a favour (and if so, how often), and whether they had ever witnessed somebody pay money to a police officer or promise the officer a favour (and if so, how often).

**Statistical analysis**

Like other studies in this area we use latent variable modeling to estimate associations between central constructs. To estimate latent variables and fit measurement models we use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modelling (SEM) in Mplus version 7 (Muthén and Muthén 2012). Models are estimated using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). FIML deals efficiently with missing data, under the assumption that missing data are Missing At Random conditional on the range of individual measures included in the model (Rubin 1987).

**Results**

**Levels of police corruption in Lahore**

Table 2 presents the overall extent of direct and indirect experience of police corruption. Strikingly, only a small minority of the sample reported never having either paid money to a police officer or promised an officer a favour to overlook their unlawful behaviour (12 per cent). A similarly small minority of the sample reported never having either witnessed somebody pay money to a police officer or having promised the officer a favour (11 per cent). The majority of people reported either having ‘sometimes’ (40 per cent) or ‘many times’ (25 per cent) paid money or promised a favour to a police officer, or witnessing the same behaviour ‘sometimes’ (42 per cent) or ‘many times’ (36 per cent).

**Perceptions of police effectiveness and fairness in Lahore**

Table 3 presents the topline findings relating to people’s beliefs about the effectiveness of the police. Echoing the relatively widespread experience of police corruption, we see small proportions of people who agreed that the police are well trained to pursue criminals (12 per cent), responded promptly to calls from the public (3 per cent), does well at controlling violent crime (6 per cent), treats everyone with respect (3 per cent), respects people’s rights (3 per cent) and so forth.

Table 4 presents people’s beliefs about police legitimacy. Compared to European Social Survey estimates (Hough et al. 2013a; 2013b), we see relatively low levels of legitimacy, with high proportions of people disagreeing that they should obey the police if

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6 More panel, experimental and cross-national designs are need (see, respectively, Mazerolle et al. 2013; Hough et al. 2013a; Bradford et al. 2014a).
they do not understand the reasons for their decisions (88 per cent), that they should obey the police if they disagree with their decisions (91 per cent), that the police are trustworthy (92 per cent), that the police are usually honest (90 per cent) and so forth.

Assessing the measurement models

How well do these indicators scale? Using CFA to assess the scaling properties and dimensionality of the data, we assume that perceptions of the effectiveness, fairness and legitimacy of the police are unobservable psychological constructs; that variation in these unobservable psychological constructs drive variation in relevant observable indicators; and that the distinctiveness of these constructs can be assessed by empirically investigating the dimensionality of the data (for discussion of reflective measurement, see Borsboom et al. 2003).
Prior work has shown the distinctiveness of public perceptions of the effectiveness and procedural fairness of the police (Reisig et al. 2007; Jackson et al. 2012a; 2012b) and felt obligation and generalized trust (Reisig et al. 2007; Dirikx and Van den Bulck 2014). Other work has combined felt obligation and generalized trust (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). We tested a four-factor model that combines felt obligation and trust into one latent construct (termed ‘legitimacy’), representing perceived effectiveness of the police, perceived procedural fairness of the police and the experience of corruption as separate latent constructs. We also tested a five-factor model that further distinguishes between felt obligation and generalized trust.

Results from the two models are shown in Table 5. Exact and approximate fit statistics indicate that Model 1 (which does not distinguish between felt obligation to obey the police and generalized trust in the police) fits the data poorly. By contrast Model 2 (which differentiates between felt obligation and generalized trust) fits the data well, at least according to the approximate fit statistics. The standardized factor loadings for each measurement model in the five-factor CFA range from 0.40 to 0.81.

Modelling relations between constructs

Figure 1 shows the results of a fitted SEM linking the latent variables via regression paths. Relations between constructs are specified according to prior work on procedural justice theory (Sunshine and Tyler 2003) and people’s experience of police corruption (Tankebe 2010). Because no path between latent variables is constrained to zero, the fit is identical to the five-factor CFA model presented in Table 4.

### Table 4  Perceptions of police legitimacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not understand the reasons for their decisions</td>
<td>146 (36%)</td>
<td>212 (52%)</td>
<td>17 (4%)</td>
<td>26 (6%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>404 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You should do what the police tell you to do, even when you disagree with their decisions</td>
<td>169 (42%)</td>
<td>198 (49%)</td>
<td>11 (3%)</td>
<td>23 (6%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>404 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not like the way they treat you</td>
<td>157 (39%)</td>
<td>208 (51%)</td>
<td>14 (3%)</td>
<td>23 (6%)</td>
<td>2 (0.5%)</td>
<td>404 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police try to find the best solution for people’s problems</td>
<td>172 (43%)</td>
<td>189 (47%)</td>
<td>18 (5%)</td>
<td>24 (6%)</td>
<td>1 (0.25%)</td>
<td>404 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lahore police are trustworthy</td>
<td>193 (48%)</td>
<td>180 (44%)</td>
<td>26 (6%)</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>404 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lahore police are usually honest</td>
<td>178 (44%)</td>
<td>185 (46%)</td>
<td>38 (9%)</td>
<td>2 (0.5%)</td>
<td>1 (0.25%)</td>
<td>404 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5  Fit statistics for four factor and five factor confirmatory factor analysis models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>( p )</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>RMSEA 90% CI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>TLI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>&lt;.0005</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.085–0.101</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>0.748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>&lt;.0005</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.041–0.060</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CI = confidence interval; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index.
Moving from left to right, we find that experience of corruption is negatively correlated with perceptions of the effectiveness of the police ($B = -0.44, p < .001$) and perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police ($B = -0.35, p < .001$). People with direct and indirect experience of police corruption tend to think that the police are both ineffective and unfair. About 20 per cent of the variance in perceived police effectiveness is explained by variance in corruption experience. About 12 per cent of the variance in perceived police fairness is explained by variance in corruption experience.

Turning to generalized trust, 77 per cent of the variance is explained by corruption experience, perceived effectiveness and perceived procedural fairness. Perceived effectiveness is the strongest predictor of generalized trust. Controlling for levels of corruption experience and perceived fairness, a one-unit increase in perceived effectiveness is associated with a 0.63 unit increase in the expected value of generalized trust. Controlling for levels of corruption experience and perceived effectiveness, a one-unit increase in perceived fairness is associated with a 0.34 unit increase in the expected value of generalized trust. Finally, police corruption is not associated with generalized trust, controlling for levels of perceived effectiveness and perceived fairness.
For felt obligation, 11 per cent of the variance is explained by corruption experience, perceived effectiveness and perceived procedural fairness. By contrast to generalized trust, perceived fairness is the strongest predictor. Controlling for levels of corruption experience and perceived effectiveness, a one-unit increase in perceived fairness is associated with a 0.21 unit increase in the expected value of felt obligation ($p < .05$). Neither perceived effectiveness nor corruption experience is a statistically significant predictor of felt obligation.

Finally, we estimated the indirect effects of police corruption on trust and felt obligation (using the INDIRECT command in MPlus 7). Put another way, we assessed the extent to which the experience of police corruption explains variation in felt obligation and generalized trust through intervening associations with perceived police effectiveness and perceived police fairness. The total standardized indirect effect of corruption on generalized trust is $-0.40$ ($p < .001$), with the majority of this flowing through perceived effectiveness ($B = -0.28$, $p < .001$; for perceived fairness, $B = -0.12$, $p < .05$). Turning to felt obligation, corruption explains less variation via perceived effectiveness and perceived fairness, with the total standardized indirect effect of corruption on felt obligation being $-0.13$ ($p < .01$), flowing equally through perceived fairness ($B = -0.07$, $p < .05$) and perceived effectiveness ($B = -0.06$, $p > .05$).

Thus, corruption is more strongly linked to generalized trust than it is to felt obligation, and most of the association seems to flow through effectiveness rather than through fairness. Thus, people with a lot of experience of police corruption tend not to trust police motives and intentions, in large part because they believe that the police are not dealing with crime and reducing risk. For felt obligation, the estimated effect seems to flow equally through effectiveness and fairness. Here, corruption is linked to felt duty to obey through the sense of effectiveness and the sense of fairness.

**Discussion**

In this article, we have presented findings from a survey of adult experiences and perceptions in two towns in Lahore, Pakistan. We have shown relatively widespread experience of police corruption, relatively low levels of perceived police effectiveness and fairness, and relatively low levels of what Tom Tyler (Tyler and Jackson 2014) has called ‘popular legitimacy.’ Modelling corruption experience, perceived effectiveness, perceived fairness and perceived legitimacy, our analysis has been guided by a relational account of people’s connection to legal authorities. The central tenet of procedural justice theory is that, when individual police officers wield their power and authority in fair and just ways, this legitimizes that power and authority in the eyes of the policed. Of particular interest was that half of the estimated indirect effect of experienced corruption on felt obligation to obey the police (the *first dimension* of perceived police legitimacy) was mediated through beliefs about police
fairness. This finding accords with prior theory that predicts that people internalize the value that one should obey legal authorities when they believe that those legal authorities wield their power in fair ways (Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler 2006a) and corruption is key to this sense of procedural justice.

But we also found that perception of police effectiveness was a stronger predictor of generalized trust in the police than perceptions of police procedural fairness. Moreover, much of the estimated indirect effect of experienced corruption on generalized trust in the police (the second dimension of perceived police legitimacy) was mediated through beliefs about police effectiveness. This is consistent with the idea that people in these two towns of Lahore judge whether the police have their best interests at heart partly through the lens of whether this authority seems to be effectively policing crime and act according to the rule of law. A lack of an effective and honest police service seems to signal abandonment and exclusion to those forced to live under such conditions, thereby weakening their sense that police are ‘on their side’ and thus share their values.

Overall, our findings speak to a possible boundary condition of procedural justice theory (cf. Tankebe 2009; Bradford et al. 2014a) while also stressing the importance of police corruption in a new context. The basic social utility of police may be doubted more in Pakistan than it is in the United States, UK and Australia. Under such conditions, people may draw more heavily on their assessments of the effectiveness of the police when forming their legitimacy judgments (Tankebe 2010). In the United States, UK and Australia the essential social utility of the police is often taken as a given; people’s response to perceived crime problems is often not to blame the public police, nor to turn to alternative providers of policing services, but to call for a greater level of intervention from the police (Girling et al. 2000). It may be that a baseline assumption of police efficacy in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia opens up a greater space for procedural justice judgments, while at the same time dampening down variation in legitimacy linked to effectiveness judgments. In a context such as Pakistan this baseline sense of usefulness is still to be established, resulting perhaps in a comparatively greater emphasis on instrumental concerns about effectiveness. There may be an important parallel with Ghana, in which ‘...the failure of successive postcolonial governments to embark on any genuine and meaningful democratic reforms of the Ghana police to build strong attachments between the police and the citizenry’ (Tankebe 2009: 1280).

Importantly, police corruption was also strongly linked to police legitimacy in Lahore. This builds on existing evidence that pervasive corruption and inefficiency have been a major cause of public mistrust in the police, with national Corruption Perception Surveys conducted from 2002 to 2011 finding that the police are seen by member of the public as the most corrupt state organization in the country (Transparency International Pakistan 2011). The police are often deemed as chronically corrupt, inefficient, ill equipped and loyal to power elites of the society (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2010), and the government of Pakistan has intermittently tried to reform this institution. Against the backdrop of rising militancy in Pakistan and the role of police in attempting to control this phenomenon, the then-president of Pakistan Parvez Musharraf doubled the salaries of police officials. Modernized equipment was provided to the police, more women were recruited and police training was improved. Yet, no change seems to have been observed in this
institution. Despite all these measures, the police infrastructure in Pakistan is outdated and yet to meet the emerging challenges of the modernized age.

Overall, our findings suggest that people will come to legitimize the police more fully in Lahore, Pakistan only when the police establish a minimal level of efficiency in controlling crime and responding to the needs of victims, when they operate more fully under the rule of law, and when they treat citizens and make decisions in ways that accord with principles of procedural justice. An intelligence-based policing system that is staffed by well-trained and well-equipped officers committed to high standards of integrity and accountability seems indispensible in any effort to overcome the challenges Pakistani police is facing. Depoliticising the police may help, particularly in as much as this breaks links between police and various factions within the Pakistani elite. Police corruption needs to be checked through strict performance evaluation and a stringent and systematic system of accountability. Only through such reforms can police legitimacy—so crucial to crime control and the administration of justice—be established and maintained.

On a final note, the preceding text has alluded to an ailing police system in Pakistan. By and large, the public image and experience of the police revolves around the constable on the beat and, at most, up to the Station House Officer, who is in charge of the police station and is supposedly a focal point for redressal of public grievances. These are the officers that ordinary people encounter, who provide the ‘teachable moments’ (Tyler 2011b) during encounters with citizens, within which legitimacy is shaped, reproduced or undermined. These officers are themselves ordinary people, often drawn from deprived social backgrounds. Systemic reform of the police in Pakistan implies hitting the cultural iceberg that underpins the ideas, actions and beliefs of these officers: police culture, political culture, feudal culture, colonial culture, mafia culture and above all the working class culture of the individuals entering the base of police service pyramid. The police constables are not only poorly paid; they also work in poorly equipped environment. So, they move from a family culture of poverty to a work culture of poverty, but in the process gain authoritative power, which is then, unsurprisingly, prone to be misused for gaining quick personal dividends, and prone to exploitation by other components of the cultural iceberg, which is full of a variety of power players with an interest in influencing police activity. Poorly paid constables and Station House Officers appear to be tools in the hands of powerful actors in the social and political systems of Pakistani society. Moreover, corruption for personal gain and corruption at the behest of others are linked: if they can (ab)use their authoritative power for others, why not to use it for themselves as well? In order for systematic reform to have any chance of success, the components of the cultural icebergs upon which police officers stand will have to be identified, analyzed, dismantled and reshaped realistically.

**References**


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